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ABSTRACT 
The form of political system in Nigeria in the early post-colonial period was characterized by a 
clientelistic structure whose top echelon was occupied by the new elites who captured the 
economic and political powers of the Nigerian state immediately after independence. They were 
patron occupying state offices as “pre-bends”. They became the “gate-keeper”; determines the 
development initiative to be followed and employed and benefactors of privileges. Studies of 
Godfathering and political patronage in Nigeria have not adequately addressed how these 
patronage has remained an important aspect of the political and economic powers of the state. 
This study, therefore, examined God fatherism and political patronage in Nigeria: a theoretical 
overview. A synthesis of elite, coalition, party system and meritocratic theories provided the 
conceptual framework. The design was exploratory and the study was descriptive in nature, 
combining both secondary data from books and the internet. Modern political institutions 
controlled by elites acquired power through the people. This development places political elites 
in a position to bestow privilege and concessions as they deemed fit. Hence, this engender the 
creation of a clientelistic structure with political elites as patrons and the vast majority of 
population as clients willing to yield their loyalty to patrons for the satisfaction of valued 
resources. Patrons who, due to their influence on the state apparatus, control both political and 
economic powers therefore, more often than not control the direction development takes in these 
areas. The resultant inequality therefore, produces a class of elites who control the economic 
and political powers of the state and another class of masses who yield their loyalty to the elites 
in order to secure access to state surpluses to be delivered as “good” or compensation for 
loyalty. Since access to valued resources is assured through the clientelistic structure, the 
emergent social relationships may have implication for Nigeria‟s development both in the rural 
and urban areas. 




Political patronage via state jobs is global phenomenon dispensed by governing political 
party or parties but this phenomenon in Africa lead to poor institutional quality or performance 
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of the state.  In the 1980s and 1990s many African states adopted a multiparty democracy based 
on two distinct systems of governance (Nijzinket al, 2006; Kopecky, 2011). Countries such as 
Mozambique, Gabon, Ghana, and Nigeria among others, adopted a presidential system of 
governance based on the United States philosophy while countries such as South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, Malawi, etc., adopted a parliamentary system based on the Westminster governance 
tradition, other states such as Senegal, Cape Verde and Namibia adopted a combination of the 
two systems of governance (Nijzinket al, 2006; Kopecky, 2011). These political changes were 
brought up by the political parties, which were seen then as liberation movements.  
However, soon after this democratization process, many African states were bedeviled by 
many problems such as poor institutional quality or poor economic performance, 
unconstitutional change of government, political violence and so forth. Poor quality or 
performance of the state is blamed on political patronage, among others (Nijzinket al, 2006; 
Kopecky, 2011). It is worth noting that political party structures undoubtedly can either limit or 
enhance the powers and operations of the state institutions including the legislature. The ensuing 
debate in the public administration or political science scholarship is whether political patronage 
promotes or hinders institutional performance or quality (Mamogale, 2013). Rival theoretical 
explanations are advanced by different scholars on the relationship between political patronage 
and state economic performance.  
The focus of this study was to examine the phenomenon of “God fatherism and political 
patronage in Nigeria: a theoretical overview”. Though, the concept is as old as politics itself, its 
recent rise in Nigerian politics gives reasons for the evaluation of the concepts and the impact it 
makes in the political space of country. 
Conceptual review 
It is not surprising that much of the writings about political patronage in the political 
science or public administration literatures focused more on developing nations, Africa in 
particular. This is because many post-colonial African states were castigated as predatory, 
patrimonial, choice-less democracies, kleptocracy, rent-seeking, etc. As a result, political 
patronage, which is associated with names like political appointment system or cadre 
deployment in Nigerian context is seen as immoral and a democratic pathology, which is 
associated with malfunctioning of the governance systems (Mamogale, 2013). Therefore, 
political patronage is conceptualized as an exchange relationship in which a variety of goods and 
services are traded between the political Godfather and the godson.  
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Usually these varieties of goods and services are not traded within the confines of the law 
and regulations. This simply means that the way in which these goods and services are traded 
between the principal and the agent does not follow any legal prescripts (Mamogale, 2013). In 
order words, political patronage or simply cadre deployment is not a legislated policy of 
government thus often leading non-compliance with recruitment or rather human resource 
management laws and regulations (Kopecky, 2011). 
From a principal-agent perspective or what Weber (1948) calls “super” and “subordinate” 
relationship in a political setting, the principal simply refers to a politician as an elected public 
representative who is not purely a administrative figure, whereas the agent refers to the state 
official who is appointed presumably on the basis of qualifications to occupy specialized office 
either on contractual basis or permanent basis. The principle of “super-subordinate” relations in 
the institutions means there is a regulated supervision of the lower office by the higher ones and 
this principle is found in all institutional structures of the economy (Kopecky, 2011). Politics is 
about power relations between the principal and the agent. The agent is hired and rewarded to 
implement policy preferences of the principal. The political principal, on the other hand, has the 
leverage to offer legislation, access to state structures and or job opportunities in exchange for 
various benefits such as electoral support, campaign contributions, party loyalty, exclusive 
information and expertise available from the agent. 
The constitutional provision of ruler-ship in Nigeria is the Party system and the 
constitution has made the formation of political parties wholly a private investment. All 
candidates must depend upon political parties for canvassing for, votes from the electorate. This 
is in contrast to political systems with provision for independent candidature. The formation of 
political parties in democracies is capital intensive in nature, hence it involves the rich and 
wealthy individuals who can fund and maintain them. In the third world, these individuals make 
up the clique known as the "Godfathers" whose patronage and interests are required for the 
smooth running of the party system (Philip, Chirs, Osimeral & Kingley, 2014). 
As William (1979) observed, political elites 'participate in, or influence the making of, 
decisions that allocate resources within and among social units'. A variety of conflicts are 
produced in the process. Discourses on political elitism raise two important questions: hierarchy 
and inequality. 'Hierarchy' has to do with the vertical ranking of people in the society into two 
categories, namely, those at the top and those occupying the lowest positions. Those at the 
bottom are assumed to be less important than those on top (William, 1979).  
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These social hierarchies are assumed to be pyramidal in nature. There are more people at 
the bottom of the hierarchy than those on top. The latter are the crème dusac of the society and 
are responsible for exercise of social, economic and political powers. Their powers consists 
largely in their ability to 'articulate ideas, to persuade, to cajole and coerce, to mobilize, to 
embody and advance symbols top which large numbers of people respond‟ (William, 1979).It is 
in respect of this point that the notion of political elite is associated with inequality. The political 
elites simply organize themselves in a manner that makes them superior to the rest of their 
society. This inequality makes it easy for us to differentiate between 'rulers' (the political elites) 
and the ruled (the masses). 
An important issue raised by Pareto and Marx in their works is that political elites 
insulate and isolate themselves from their society and try as much as possible to reproduce 
themselves from within. They do all possible within their reach to ensure that non-elites do not 
join their membership. To ensure this, the political elites maintain a safe, functional distance 
from the rest of the society. They reproduce themselves on an individual and selective basis in a 
process which Pareto specifically referred to as the 'circulation of elites'. The criteria for such 
elite recruitment are often parochial and the process is usually done in a manner that does not in 
any way compromise the traditional integrity of the dominant elite class. As Pareto argued, the 
dominant class often tries to frustrate any efforts at the 'collective circulation of elites' and would 
rather support individual recruitment. 
Conceptualizing the term Political Patronage 
A form al definition of patronage is "the power of appointing people to governmental or 
political positions" and "the positions so distributed" (Webster‟s II New College Dictionary 
1995).  Generally, the word patronage has a negative connotation that this straight-forward 
definition fails to convey. Patronage suggests the transgression of real or perceived boundaries of 
legitimate political influence, the violation of principles of merit and competition in civil service 
recruitment and promotion. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that governments the world-
over accept   that some political appointments are fully legitimate. A small number of these 
appointments are justified as a means for political leaders to fashion a circle of government 
policymakers and managers who share a common agenda. Patronage is clearly a problem, 
however, when these appointments pervade public administration, severely undermining merit 
principles. Somewhere between these two extremes the line between appropriate and 
inappropriate uses of patronage is crossed.  
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Political patronage is the dispensation of favours or rewards such as public office, jobs, 
contracts, subsidies, prestige or other valued benefits by a patron (who controls their 
dispensation) to a client. The patron is usually an elected official or is otherwise empowered to 
make such grants. In return, the client supplies the patron with some valued service, such as 
voting for the patron‟s party or providing money or labour for electoral campaigning. The 
relationship between patron and client is typically unequal, selective and discretionary; the 
patron does not generally grant favours to all potential clients but picks and chooses among 
them. 
Conceptualizing the term God fathering 
The concept of godfatherism is synonymous to intermediary, mentoring, benevolence, 
and support and sponsoring. In a political setting, the concept is an ideology that is championed 
on the belief that certain individuals possess considerable means to unilaterally determine who 
get a party‟s ticket to run for an election and who wins in the electoral contest (Chukwuemaka, 
Oji, & Chukwurah, 2013). Godfathers are men who have the „power‟ and influence to decide 
both who get nominated to context elections and who wins in the election. In this sense, 
Godfatherism means office seekers getting connected to an individual who is believed to have 
the ability to deliver a desired outcome in an electoral contest. It is the tradition for looking for a 
political father to help promote one‟s political aspiration.  
Bassey and Enetak (2008) conceptualized godfatherism to connote the power and 
influence of people who are politically relevant in deciding who gets nominated to contest 
elections and who eventually wins the election. Godfathers are highly politically mobile and can 
sway political support to the political party and/or candidate behind which they throw their 
political weight. Those that play godfatherism are known as godfathers while those who benefit 
from their benevolence are known as godsons.  
The advent of godfatherism in the Nigerian partisan politics dates back to the First 
Republic when leaders of the three major political parties (Northern People Congress (NPC), 
Action Group (AG) and National Congress of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) carefully and 
meticulously cultivated godsons that they were convinced would advance the well being of the 
citizens. According to Bassey and Enetak (2008), Ahmadu Bello of NPC, Nnamdi Azikiwe of 
the NCNC and Obafemi Awolowo of the AG were motivated to do so not to use godsons as 
surrogates to promote parochial interests, but to promote the developmental aspirations of the 
people. Unlike the present crop of political godfathers, the first generation godfathers were 
essentially benevolent and progressive because they did not abuse their status as godfathers by 
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imposing frivolous demands on their godsons as it is the case today. Literally godfathers are seen 
in Nigeria to be men who have the power personally to determine both who get nominated to 
contest elections and who wins in a state.  
 
 
The nexus between the concept of Political Patronage and Godfatherism 
 The term patronage appears with increased frequency in anthropological analysis. Indeed, 
it has become a major concept in the study of peasant societies, somewhat analogous to the 
concept of the “big man” in certain kinds of chiefdoms, or “fission and fusion” in lineage-type 
societies (Jeremy, 1966). There is, however, considerable ambiguity in the meaning given to the 
term. Patronage is found on the reciprocal relations between patrons and clients. By patron it 
means a person who uses his “client”, and in return provides certain services for his patron. 
Patronage is thus the complex of relations between those who use their influence, social position 
or some other attribute to assist and protest others, and those whom they to help and protest 
(Jeremy, 1966). 
 The structure of the system of patronage, which is based on social relationships between 
clients seeking for a man with the ability and friendship connections to protect them and a patron 
who accepts these duties in return for political allegiance, grows upwards and through lawyers, 
other persons of influence, and members of parliament, is linked to the legislative assembly. 
Thus the organization of government and the structure of patronage are parallel hierarchies 
(Campbell, 1964). In patronage, the transactor (patron) has the power to give some benefit which 
the respondent (client) desires. Examples of this would be the improvement of a road near the 
respondent‟s house, or the employment of the respondent (or his relative) in an office over which 
the (patron) has control. The number and extent of such benefits naturally vary with the power of 
the (patron); but even the most influential is unlikely to please everyone who comes to him. He 
must therefore husband these direct patronage transactions so that they produce linkages with 
key people who can bring followers with them (Adrian, 1966). 
 In some countries such as Canada the term is used to describe political patronage or 
political Godfatherism. political patronage is refers to the dispensation of favours or rewards 
such as public office, jobs, contracts, subsidies, prestige or other valued benefits by a patron 
(who controls their dispensation) to a client (The Canadian Encyclopedia, 2013). While political 
godfatherism connotes the invasion of the political candidates by discarnate powerful sponsor, 
tending to complete possession for the purpose selfish gratification (Mbamara, 2004, Bassey & 
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Enetak, 2008). For some, the godfather is the political slave merchant while the godson is the 
political slave or slave boy or political article for sale.  
The godson is purchased with big sum of money under a democratic oath. Their aims and 
objectives include appointments, stealing, robbery and looting of government treasury. The 
decision making appointments and contract awards is usually manipulated by the godfather. In 
the words of Ajayi (2014), Chukwuemeka, Oji & Chukwurah (2013), Godfatherism is a kind of; 
Politics whereby an influential person in a popular or ruling party will assist someone usually a 
lackey, i.e. godson to emerge as the governorship candidate of a party at all cost and either by 
hook or crook, he will help him to emerge victorious in the state governorship election 
irrespective of whether he is a popular candidate or not.  
Intuitively, political godfatherism represents a self-seeking individual out there to use the 
government for his own purposes (Isaac, 2005). The cost of this incidence is enormous to the 
state as what usually obtains is that when the incumbent godson is at pains to satisfy the whims 
and caprices of the godfather among other competing demands on the scarce resources of the 
government, the interest of the larger number is savagely undermined. This according to Joseph 
(1999) has left democracy in Nigeria to assume the form of prebendalism. The French 
'godfathers' can be broken down into two types: the first are those who manipulate the economy 
for their own benefit, and the second those that can be referred to as crisis fixers, social 
reformers, and populist advocates of the poor (Newsweek, 2003).  
Political patronage and politics in Nigeria 
The patron/client relationships that popularized the term in Nigerian politics have cultural 
roots among many Nigerians. It is not a totally new experience in the sociology of the Hausa, 
Yoruba and Igbo for people to have one or other type of 'godfather' (Isaac, 2005). For example, 
the word 'godfather' has a local equivalence in Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo languages and these 
words have been in usage since the pre-colonial era. A godfather is known among the Hausa as a 
'maigida' (landlord or the head of a household). The word 'maigida' goes beyond its literal 
meaning.  
Abner, Paul & Polly (1965) used the term in their works to refer to those who provided 
brokerage services to Hausa traders in transit in different parts of West Africa. These Hausa 
traders brought cattle from their homeland to different parts of South-Western part of Africa and 
took back kola nuts to the North. At the various transit centers where they have to stop to do 
businesses, they rely on a maigida to facilitate their economic activities. The maigida provides 
them with accommodation, storage and brokerage services. The maigida receive compensations 
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for their services and many of them became rich from the number of clients they had. Even in 
Hausa land, from where these itinerant traders came, this kind of patron/client relationship is 
popularly known (Albert, 2005). 
A 'godfather' is referred to in Yoruba land as 'baba-kekere' (the small father), 'baba-isale' 
(the father of the underground world), or 'baba-nigbejo' (a great help in times of trouble). The 
most historical of these terms is 'baba-kekere'. It was used to depict community leaders with 
whom people of less social status identified as a way of providing physical, social, political and 
economic security for themselves. For example, most of the Yoruba refugees who came to settle 
in Ibadan in the early nineteenth century settled with the 'baba-kekere' in the city (Falola, 1985).   
These were military chiefs and patrons appointed tobe in charge of certain Ibadan 
colonies by the town's traditional council. The migrants who settled under these Ibadan chiefs 
paid the 'baba-kekere' tribute, part of which the 'baba-kekere' transmitted to the Ibadan 
authorities. In return, the chiefs were obligated to protect those under them against any act of 
violence that characterized Ibadan at this time. 
Dibia (2003) too has observed that the idea of godfatherism is grounded in the sociology 
of traditional Igbo society. He made reference to the popular relationship between 'Nnam-Ukwu' 
(my master) and 'Odibo' (the servant) in the Igbo world view. A younger person is entrusted to a 
more mature and experienced person for training in social, economic and moral adulthood. The 
role played by the man in this kind of relationship is akin to that of a godfather. In the cases 
mentioned above, a person of lesser social status attaches himself to another person, usually of 
higher status, for support, which could be social or economic. The godfather gets something in 
return from the adopted son for the transactional relationship. It is probably on this 
understanding that the modern notion of godfatherism in Nigeria is based. 
 In other words, the phenomenon of godfatherism is not strange to the cultural world of 
the Nigerian people. The giving of kola by a client to his patron is also not strange. What is 
probably strange is that the transposition of this social or economic system into the political 
arena and also the ridiculous nature of what patrons now ask for from their clients as 
compensation for providing them with 'brokerage services' (Isaac, 2005).  
Five types of political godfathers are discernible under the present democratic 
dispensation in Nigeria. The first type is 'geo-political' or 'ethnic' organizations that arrogate to 
themselves the right to decide who represent their jurisdiction in government. Such movements 
under the present democratic dispensation include 'Afenifere', the Yoruba socio-cultural 
organization; Arewa Consultative Council (ACF) which presents itself as the authentic voice of 
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the North; Ohaneze, the pan-Igbo cultural group that considers itself to be the only body with the 
power to determine Igbo interests. The powers of all these organizations have been receding 
recently. This is to the extent that their candidates for political offices are often defeated by those 
sponsored by 'individual godfathers'.  
The second category consists of 'geo-political' or 'ethnic father figures'. These are some 
prominent individuals within some geo-political or ethnic organization who are popularly 
respected by members of the movement they belong to, as a result of some past 'nationalist 
activities'. Such people, very few in the Nigerian society, have occupied public positions in the 
past and were found to have served their people to the best of their ability. Their political 
opinions are thus much respected.  
The best known example of this class of godfathers was the slain Nigerian Minister for 
Justice, Chief Bola Ige. He was the Deputy leader of Afenifere, but his influence in Yoruba 
politics towered above that of the pan-ethnic group. He was a godfather to many south-western 
Nigerian governors between 1999 and 2003.He was considered to be a true scion of Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo. During his tenure as the Executive Governor of the defunct Oyo state (1979-
1983), he performed so well that he became idolized by the Yoruba people of South Western 
Nigeria as an embodiment of 'free education, free health' policies of the late Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo.  
In his lifetime, politicians in south western Nigeria made sure that he was on their 
campaign train. Even after his death, politicians (most especially members of Alliance for 
Democracy (AD) campaigned under his name. He is believed to have played a prominent role in 
the choice of the governors of Oyo and Osun states during the 1999 elections. His name 
consistently came up during the Bisi Akande vs. Omisore conflicts in Osun state 1999-2002 as 
the godfather to Governor Bisi Akande. One thing with this first set of godfathers is that they are 
well-known and have the support of grassroots people. The respect people have for them is also 
tied to concrete developmental issues.  
The third category of political godfathers consists of some rich Nigerians who see 
sponsorship of political candidates as a source of upward social and economic mobility. Such 
politicians go around, like a typical businessman, looking for 'materials' (not necessarily 
marketable) to invest their money in. The clients are usually people who are interested in 
winning elections 'by all means' but who do not have the grassroots support, the money, or the 
violent dispositions for winning elections.  
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The godfather assures the candidate of easy availability of this possible assistance in 
exchange for some personal benefits for the godfather after election. Many of these godfathers 
keep their promise of making the candidates win their elections. This could be any form of 
electoral malpractice, but is hardly through any honest political activities. Uba, the best-known 
political godfather under the present dispensations in Nigeria, is a good example of this kind of 
godfather. He nominated and ensured the victory of governor Ngige of Anambra State during the 
2003 elections (Isaac, 2005). 
The fourth type of godfathers consists of those who only deal with rich clients. Such 
people, for want of appropriate terminology, can be said to be 'political entrepreneurs' (Isaac, 
2005). They live on politics. The only asset they have is that they are well schooled in the tricks 
of winning elections among the grassroots people. They are familiar with all constituencies to be 
won over in a political contest and what it formally and informally takes to win them over. They 
often are not rich people but their clients are. The contractual relationship between the two is 
simple: the client provides the money and the godfather delivers the votes. In other words, this 
category of godfathers does not invest their own money but that of their clients in politics. In 
exchange, they are accorded important status in the government formed by their clients after 
election. They are given juicy contracts as well as slots in ministerial and board appointments.  
The fifth type of godfather consists of rich patrons who are willing to provide what it 
takes for either rich or poor clients to win elections. He is willing to provide poor candidates with 
money and logistical support to win elections and he is ready to contribute to the campaign funds 
of rich candidates as well as provide him with logistical support. Dr Sola Saraki of Kwara State 
has played this kind of role in the past. He supported several poor people to win elections in 
Kwara State. Governor Mohammed Lawal, the governor of Kwara State with whom he has his 
major running battle cannot be said to be a poor man. He is a retired naval officer and a former 
military governor. He was a man of immense means before he was nominated by Saraki to 
become the governor of Kwara State in 1999. 
The implications of Political Patronage on Democratic Governance  
Political patronage is one of the factors that embedded democratic setting in Nigeria since 
first republic (Oshodi, 2011). Regrettably in the face of dilapidation or non-sufficient existence 
of social infrastructures especially in states and local governments, public resources are used for 
political patronage. In Nigeria‟s fourth republic, the emergence of „godfatherism‟ posed great 
threat not only to good governance but also the socio-economic stability of democratic 
governance (Chukwuemeka, 2012). Perhaps one of the most disturbing and damaging influence 
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of political patronage in Nigeria‟s fourth republic was in domain of making nonsense of a truly 
free, fair and credible electoral process in which the electorates by right are expected to freely 
elect people of their choice into public office to represent their interests. 
 Indeed, the privilege of electing people of their choice into public office was denied 
given the situation in which „godfathers‟ foisted candidates of their preference on the generality 
of the people. This is to say the least very inimical to the tenets of democratic rule, when public 
office holders would not be accountable to the people, who at any rate did not count in their 
elections into public office. Invariably, the loyalty of such public office holders would be tilted 
towards their godfathers and this in itself negates one of the critical attributes of democracy 
which is responsive and transparent government.  
This scenario is also inimical to good governance and political stability which are 
predicated on the rule of law, due process, accountability and transparency in the management of 
public business. The emergence of political patronage has also robbed the citizens of the 
privilege of enjoying the dividends of democratic governance in the sense that the-would be 
government became reluctant to initiate and implement policies that would advance the 
wellbeing of the generality of the citizens. This was as a result of the fact that political patronage 
in Nigeria was basically predatory in nature.  
The primary motive of venturing into politics was borne out of the need to acquire money 
from the coffers of government to which their godsons held sway. Therefore the lean financial 
resource accruable to the state from the federation account which was meant for the 
improvement of living standard of the citizens was paramount interest to them. In instances 
where the „godsons‟ upon reflection refused to settle their „godfathers‟ as agreed upon before 
securing public office, hell was let loose. The experiences recorded in Enugu State in 1999 
between Jim Nwobodo and Governor Chimaroke Nnamani. Also in 2007 between Governor 
Sullivan Chime and Chimaroke Nnamani were awful.  
Another far reaching effects of political patronage on the entrenchment of good 
governance, which in turn would engender democratic growth and stability, according to Uduji 
(2009) is the complete erosion of the normative elements of democracy of which trusts is a sine-
qua-non attribute between the government and the governed. In a polity where prescribed rules 
guiding the electoral process are frequently disobeyed with impunity, the basis of citizen‟s trust 
in government was compromised. If the situation is not decisively addressed with the urgency it 
deserves, the resultant effect is that trust as a vital social capital is lost, and when there is no trust 
between the government and the governed, interaction would only take place on the basis of 
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mutual suspicion and this does not augur well for the healthy development of democratic 
governance. 
However, political patronage has become a scary phenomenon in Nigerian politics. As 
observed by Omotola (2007), political patronage in Nigeria, particularly in its current form and 
character, is distributive. Though it is a longstanding and deeply rooted feature of the cultural 
values of Nigerian society, where it is purely socio-economic in nature and mutually productive 
for both parties, its politicization would appear to have contributed to the criminalization of 
politics. Political patrons reign across all spheres of the society: academics, legal, and religion 
environment. 
Therefore, the clamour for democracy in Nigeria is to improve both political and socio-
economic situation of the country through massive involvement in the policy making, but reverse 
is the case as those that attained political power in both legislative and executive arms of 
government got to the seat of powers through the support of some political „godfathers‟ in 
various states cum the center, however, the desire of political godfathers is to hold political and 
socio-economic powers both at the center cum the component units as mechanisms to politically 
influence the activities of political office holders, that is, the Governors and some Legislators in 
terms of appointing people into various positions, such as Ministers/Commissioners, Chairmen 
of the boards, Secretaries to the various Institutions, and Treasurers of Local Governments as 
well as allocation of some developmental projects into various localities within the state or center 
as well (Alabi and Sakariyau, 2013). 
Consequently, the impact of the political patrons on Nigeria‟s general elections was 
unprecedented. Political patrons are those who have the security connections, extended local 
links, enormous financial weight to plot and determine the success of a power seeker at any level 
of a supposedly competitive politics. Although political patronage has an institutionalized feature 
in Nigerian politics over the years, its contemporary manifestations suggest that it has assumed 
epidemic proportions, becoming one of the greatest threats to democratic consolidation in 
Nigeria (Omotola, 2007). The recent activities of some Nigerian political patrons could be 
likened to attributes of mafianism; however, some still see the existence of political patrons as 
the „balancer‟ of power in a democracy.  
Akinola (2009) believes in the need to have a good-hearted individual (people‟s hero) at 
the sole realm of absolute power, a political patrons distributes power as he deems, and anoints 
who rules. But, political patronage has taken a strange dimension in Nigeria‟s political 
environment. It has become a menace pulling down the foundations of masses-driven 
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governance, thereby denying Nigerians the much-deserved dividends of democracy. Ademola 
(2004) added that since 1999, when Nigeria joined the comity of democratically governed 
countries, it has continued to experience an unprecedented rise in political violence ranging from 
increased crime wave, armed robbery, political assassination, and religious riots as a result of 
crises loomed between „godfathers‟ and some  „godsons‟. 
 Indeed, Nigeria has joined the comity of democratic nations with the hope that the ideals 
of democracy will be upheld and sustained. However, the signals political events in Nigeria are 
showing are that what we actually have is a democratic system „sustained‟ by political patrons. It 
is not one primarily aimed at improving the welfare of the people. Rather it is system the 
political class craves for in order to gain access to state resources to finance patronage, 
patrimonialism and for personal gains (Omobowale, 2007). This is why violence has to be used 
to silence the opposition and actualize primitive and exploitative acquisition. Thus, what the 
present democratic dispensation have brought forth for Nigeria in general is a system sustained 
by hoodlums for the sake of the political class and not the electorate. 
Theoretical framework 
In explaining God fathering and political patronage in Nigeria, the following theoretical 
paradigm was to be considered: 
Coalition theory 
This theory focuses on government formation, which simply means on how governing 
political party or parties enter and construct and consolidate their own government identity 
(Wood, 1998; Furlong, 1989; Scott, 1997). According to this theory, one way to do exactly that 
is through dispensing patronage politics via state jobs whereby political principals distribute and 
manage state institutions‟ jobs in order to bargain over policy output. For this school of thought, 
political patronage or rather political appointment system is an „inherent‟ feature of all governing 
political parties in government worldwide and there is no problem in dispensing the system at all.  
However, there are variations between countries on the quality and integrity of 
bureaucrats appointed based on political patronage rather than merit. It is argued that all 
governing political parties widely apply this political tool to tame, control and regulate the 
behaviour of the state agents as they may not be entirely trusted, especially as they deal daily 
with public monies and other state resources. Even countries castigated as developmental states 
such as Malaysia, Brazil, China, Japan, South Korea, etc., apply the system at varying degree 
(Wood, 1998; Furlong, 1989; Scott, 1997).  
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In similar tone, Du Gay (2000) argues that political principals dispense political 
patronage via state jobs to tame the power of agency officials and to enhance their (politicians) 
own positions within government. According to this theory, political patronage via state jobs is 
not only about controlling but also about ensuring that the state agents achieve the principals‟ 
policy objectives particularly given the danger of the opposition political parties‟ agents to derail 
and sabotage the governing political party‟s policy vision and objectives.  
Party System Theory  
The party system theory also agrees that the conduct of political parties influences the 
performance of the state institutions including the legislatures since government is constructed 
by political parties. They can either limit or enhance the powers and operations of the state 
institutions. According to this theory, certain party systems are able to limit the extent or level of 
political principals or political parties dispensing political patronage.  
This theory distinguishes between „fragile party system‟ and „competitive party system‟. 
One basic difference is on the level of competitiveness, meaning the likelihood that the 
incumbent governing political party or parties can be defeated. GrzymanA-Busse (2003) argues 
that lack of robust competition between programmatic political parties in the state results into 
ineffective and inefficient state institutions evident in poor institutional quality or performance 
thus allowing a governing party or parties to dispense political patronage via state jobs.  
This in turn leads to corruption and poor governance, which are used widely by the 
World Bank, Transparency International, etc., as indices for measuring the quality or 
performance of the state institutions worldwide. In such situation where the state is inefficient 
due to poor governance systems and or corruption, the governing political party or parties 
legitimizes itself or themselves based on their ability to reward supporters through selective 
incentives rather than their ability to generate the kinds of public goods necessary for human and 
economic development as well as growth.  
Meritocratic Theory  
This theory literally rejects political patronage via state jobs as enhancing the 
performance or quality of state institutions. Proponents of this theory (Weber, 1948; 1968; Evans 
& Rauch, 1999; Henderson et al, 2007, Miller, 2000; Ritzer, 1975; Dahlstrom, Lapuente & 
Teorell, 2011; Andreski, 1983, Johnson & Libecap, 1994) argue that political patronage leads to 
politicization rather than professionalization of state institutions. Politicization of the state 
institutions eventually culminates into poor institutional capacity and lack of accountability on 
public goods provision as the system is immoral and a democratic pathology.  
15 
 
Dahlstromet al (2012) gives an example of the mayor of Spain between 2001 and 2003 
who replaced „merit-recruited‟ state agents with political appointees. According to these 
scholars, the Spanish mayor was able to coordinate his corruption intensions with appointees he 
had himself selected based on political patronage. Conspicuously, the theory of meritocracy 
argues that poor performance by state agents appointed on political patronage is often blamed on 
others or covered up by their political principals.  
Empirical evidence indicates that officials appointed based on political patronage may be 
recalled at any time once they have lost favour with their political principals. As noted by 
Kanyane (2006), with a culture of patronage politics an atmosphere of playing safe is often 
created, which is not conducive for responsible and accountable bureaucratic institutions. 
Proponents of this theory strongly maintain that people in the state should be appointed on merit 
because such officials see office holding as a vocation. 
For this theory, office holding is not considered a source to be exploited for rents or 
emoluments nor is considered a usual exchange of services for equivalents (Weber, 1948). In the 
study of bureaucracy, Max Weber, for example, advocated for „career personnel‟ with 
specialized training and expertise, among others, as the prerequisite for employment in any 
bureaucratic institutions. Of course, Weber‟s work on bureaucracy has a profound impact on our 
theoretical understanding of how principal-agent relationship within institutions plays out and 
how the bureaucratic institution developed. Therefore, the theory of meritocracy has intellectual 
roots from the Max Weber‟s study of a bureaucracy.  
Moreover, Woodrow Wilsons (1887 in Rosenbloom, 2008) in his study of administration 
also argued for an administration apparatus that is devoid of politics and meddling after he was 
concerned about the bureaucratic system in America that operated as a bastion for political 
patronage. Proponents of this theory suggest that democratic states all over the world should 
shun away from political patronage via state jobs and embrace a culture of meritocratic 
recruitment and promotion. They argue that access to institutions of government as an employee 
should be conditioned on the bases of possession of relevant knowledge, skills and qualification 
credentials, what Max Weber (1968) refers to as „expert-officialdom‟.  
This is due to the fact that partly qualified officials in terms of specialized training and 
examination always enter the state as employees with an understanding that office holding is a 
vocation. The executive office is separated from the households much as business assets are 
separated from private fortunes. Proponents of this school of thought give examples of some 
countries such as Australia, Brazil, Malaysia, China, Japan, UK, etc., that have also introduced a 
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system of tough public civil service examination to select the best potential candidates for the 
state institutions as agents. The civil service examination system in China, for example, has a 
created a unique class of „scholar-bureaucrats‟ irrespective of family or party pedigree (Fukai & 
Fukui, 1992) even if cadre deployment is applied. 
Throughout the period of military rule and in the Nigeria‟s fourth republic (1999-2013), 
emergence of political patronage posed a great threat not only to good governance but also to the 
socio-economic development and stability of democratic governance. Perhaps, one of the most 
disturbing and damaging influence of political patronage in Nigeria‟s fourth republic was in 
domain of making nonsense of a truly free, fair and credible electoral process in which the 
electorates by right are expected to freely elect people of their choice into public office to 
represent their interests.  
Indeed, the privilege of electing people of their choice into public office was denied 
given the situations in which patrons foisted candidates of their preference on the generality of 
the people. This is to say the least very inimical to the tenets of democratic rule (Chukwuma, 
2008). When public office holders would not be accountable to the people, who at any rate did 
not count in their elections into public office, invariably, the loyalty of such public office holder 
would be tilted towards their godfathers and this in itself negates one of the critical attributes of 
governance and democracy which is responsive and transparent government. This scenario is 
also inimical to good governance and political stability which are predicated on the rule of law, 
due process, accountability and transparency in the management of public business.  
The emergence of political patronage has also robbed the citizens of the privilege of 
enjoying the dividends of democratic governance in the sense that government has become 
reluctant to initiate and implement policies that would advance the well-being of the generality 
of the citizens. This was a result of the fact that political patronage in Nigeria was basically 
predatory in nature. The primary motive of venturing into politics was born out of the need to 
acquire wealth (money) from the coffers of government to which their „godsons‟ held sways 
(Chukwumeka, 2012). Therefore, the lean financial resource accruable to the state from the 
federation account which was meant for the improvement of living standards of the citizens was 
paramount interest to them.  
Instances where the „godsons‟ (governors, chairmen)etc. refused to settle their 
„godfathers‟ as agreed before securing public office, hell was let loose. The experiences recorded 
in Senator Rashidi Ladoja of Oyo state and Lamidi Adedibu between 2003 and 2007, Olusola 
Saraki and Mohammed Lawal (2003-2007), and Chris Uba and Chris Ngige (2003-2006) were 
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awful and devastating. The end point and consequences of these „godfatherism‟ in our politic is 
that economic activities are brought to a halt, especially education sectors, health, security 
(political wrangling), agriculture, housing and infrastructural developments etc. 
The political patrons or godfathers in Nigeria see governance and political power as the 
cheapest and surest method of amassing wealth to the detriment of the governed. Sponsoring a 
weak and poor candidate to win election by appointment is seen as a lucrative business whereby 
the sponsor will invest heavily in imposing his candidate on the people as their leader, with all 
intent and protégé, called chairmen, and governors.  
Political patronage is a dangerous development in Nigeria politics. The electorates are 
impoverished the more, and the corrupt rich godfathers are corruptly enriching themselves the 
more. The circle is endless, as the solution to this menaces is the serious problem facing Nigeria 
until a morally sound, committed and patriotic leader emerge to lead the people honestly with the 
attribute of transparency, openness, people oriented policies and programmes, Nigeria economic 
development will be a mirage. The susceptibility of the political structures and institutions to the 
influence and control of forces operating outside the government but within the political system 
is a great and potential threat to growth and economic development of the country. 
Elite theory:  
The major assumptions of elite theory is that in every society there is, and must be a 
minority which rules over the rest of society, and this minority forms the political class or 
governing elite composed of those who occupy the posts of political command and more 
regularly those who can directly influence political decision. They undergo changes in its 
membership over a period of time, ordinarily by the recruitment of new individual members 
from the lower strata of the society, sometimes by the incorporation of new social groups, and 
occasionally by the complete replacement of the established elite by counter-elite. Vilfred (1935) 
opined that in every branch of human activity each individual is given an index which stands as a 
sign of his capacity, very much the way grades are given in the various subjects in examinations 
in school (Suenu, 2004, Nkwede, 2014).  
According to Suenu (2004), an elitist correlation to the understanding of political 
patronage is very apt. He sees political patrons as being synonymous with the elites. For him, 
elites in the political spheres are known in Nigerian context as godfathers. They are the ones who 
govern, and are known as the kingmakers, the notables and often seen as strongmen who control 
politics in their different domains. Apparently, in a political environment where political 
patronage is in vogue, individuals are „colonized‟ by the political patrons. In order words, 
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patrons rule by proxies. The relevance of this theory to the current study cannot be 
overemphasized. This is because of its interconnectivity to the explanation of political patronage 
in a democratic dispensation and its implication on economic development in Nigeria. 
Conclusion  
The recruitment and appointment of state agents based on political patronage than 
meritocracy creates problems of poor strategic planning outputs and capacity deficit at the 
bureaucratic level pertaining to fiscal management and public goods provision. It also creates 
institutional instability and loss of institutional memory as evident in increased number of 
prolonged acting roles as a result of suspensions of more senior state agents by their political 
principals and high staff turnover. Various successive reports in Nigeria indicate the 
performance of many state institutions in the country is increasingly regressing after democracy 
due to lack of capacity, lack of consequences for poor performance, etc.  
Nigeria has a huge pool of „expertly‟ trained and qualified labour force to draw from but 
political meddling during recruitment and promotion processes pose a threat to building a 
capable, career-oriented and professional civil service. Empirically, studies has found that state 
officials who deal with human resource issues like recruitment in Nigeria want less political 
meddling in administration. This paper then suggests that where the governing political parties 
or the political principals see a need to dispense patronage via state jobs, considerations should 
be given to the cadre‟s qualification credentials and integrity.  
Political patronage in Nigerian present democratic dispensation will continue to threaten 
the practice of popular political participation in the country if no concrete efforts are made to 
deal with the problem. Godsons who have problems with their god fathers should openly 
provide information on the type of problems they are consequently subjected to. This exposure 
could aid the democratic governance of the country by humiliating the political patrons and 
revealing to the public how the Political patrons manipulate elections in the country, that would 
ultimately culminate into the sustenance of the democratization process, which in-turn shall 
engender the sustainability of the economic development efforts of successive political parties 
and emergent governments in Nigeria in future. Finally, unless political patronage is stamped 
out of Nigerian politics, it would be difficult for Nigeria to be stable in politics, democratic 
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